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THE MATERIALITY OF MORALITY: CONFLICT MINERALS
Alexandrea L. Nelson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholder activism is not a privilege—it is a right and a
responsibility. When we invest in a company, we own part of that
company and we are partly responsible for how that company
progresses. If we believe there is something going wrong with the
company, then we, as shareholders, must become active and vocal. 1
What is material to the investor? The traditional answer would be any
financially relevant information that would change how an investor would make a
purchasing decision. In 2010, Congress pushed securities regulation into a new
realm of materiality: morality. Buried in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) is a mandate that requires the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules governing the disclosure of
“conflict minerals.” 2 Coined the “Brownback Amendment,” 3 section 1502 of
Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to adopt new rules that would require certain public
companies to report the use of conflict minerals originating in and around the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 4
Conflict minerals include minerals and metals found in everyday items, from
mobile telephones and gaming consoles to jet engine components. 5 Congress
found that U.S. companies’ “exploitation” and use of conflict minerals originating
in the DRC is aiding and financing a “conflict characterized by extreme levels of
violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and
gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian
situation . . . .” 6 The motivation behind section 1502 was to use the threat of
investor accountability to force U.S. companies to examine their supply chains and
* © 2014 Alexandrea L. Nelson. JD Candidate 2015. I would like to thank Professor
Bill Richards for teaching me to think like a lawyer and Professor Jeff Schwartz for his
assistance and thoughtful insight in developing this Note. I would also like to thank the
Utah Law Review staff for their hard work and assistance.
1
Mark Mobius, Knowing Your Shareholder Rights, FRANKLIN TEMPLETON INVS.
(Apr. 2, 2010), http://mobius.blog.franklintempleton.com/2010/04/02/knowing-your-share
holder-rights/.
2
15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A) (2012).
3
156 CONG. REC. S3976 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Feingold)
(stating that the “Brownback amendment is a significant, practical step toward” addressing
the DRC crisis).
4
15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A).
5
17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (2013).
6
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1502(a), 24 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010).
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determine whether their products are funding atrocious human rights violations.
This marks a major shift in the SEC’s traditional role as a market regulator of
financially material information or financial reporting that bears directly on a
company’s stock performance. 7 As such, section 1502, and the subsequent Conflict
Minerals Rule adopted by the SEC, has been met with severe criticism. 8 Scholars
argue that not only will this disclosure rule be ineffective, but also that it is an
inappropriate use of securities regulation because the information bears no relation
to stock performance. 9
This Note has two purposes. The first purpose is to provide a thorough
understanding of the Conflict Minerals Rule—to give a background of the rule, to
understand Congress’s motivations, and to show how the rule will be influential in
shaping investor behavior. To do this, Part II examines the history behind section
1502, including the humanitarian crisis in the DRC, and Part III outlines the SEC’s
implementation of section 1502 and its current legal challenges. The second
purpose of this Note is to make an argument that despite its critics, section 1502
represents inherently material information—that is, morality and humanitarian
factors are material to investors. Part IV explores two arguments purporting that
the Conflict Minerals Rule is a disclosure requirement that represents material
information. First, aside from its humanitarian goals, section 1502 also represents
real financial consequences including tort liability, insurance costs, and potential
penalties related to international labor and humanitarian law violations. These
costs are just as material to an investor as a quarterly earnings report. Second, the
rise of the socially responsible investor has shifted the paradigm away from
accounting and financial information, demanding more transparency on issues of
human rights and social responsibility—issues of morality are material. Finally,
Part V concludes.
II. DODD-FRANK AND THE DRC
The global relief effort in the DRC is ongoing. Every year, the United States
contributes millions of dollars to promote peace in the DRC region. 10 More
7

See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (June 10, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [hereinafter Investor’s Advocate] (“[T]he SEC
requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the
public.”).
8
See infra Part IV.
9
See, e.g., Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as
Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1339 (2012) (“[T]he
obligation to disclose a fact that, absent the legislative requirement, likely would not affect
a reasonable investor’s decision to invest in a company, is problematic from both a
securities law standpoint and a public international law standpoint . . . .”).
10
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT IS NEEDED TO DETERMINE AGENCIES’ PROGRESS TOWARD U.S.
POLICY OBJECTIVES 12 (2007) [hereinafter DRC REPORT].
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recently, Congress has tried several different legislative attempts to combat
violence in the DRC. 11 However, Dodd-Frank’s section 1502 comprises the first
time Congress has successfully passed legislation that would create a system of
supply-chain accountability, which theoretically will address violence in the
DRC. 12 This Part first outlines the complex DRC conflict. Next, this Part provides
a brief outline of the past failed attempts in DRC legislation and the current DoddFrank mandate.
A. An Estimated Forty-Five Thousand People Die Every Month in the DRC as a
Result of Violence, Poverty, and Disease 13
The DRC is one of the most violent countries in the world. From 1998 to
2007, an estimated 5.4 million Congolese people died as a result of “violence,
disease, and starvation.” 14 Located in the center of Africa, the country is roughly
the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. 15 The current violence is
a result of the DRC’s complicated history and two complex civil wars that raged
between 1996 and 2003. 16 Today, the DRC’s vast and lucrative natural resources
are at the core of the continued violence.17 “[T]he mismanagement and illicit trade
of extractive resources from the [DRC] supports conflict between militias and
armed domestic factions in neighboring countries.” 18 Armed groups use murder,
starvation, and sexual crimes to maintain power over mining zones. 19 The violence
and instability created by armed groups has contributed to the DRC being one of
the “poorest and least developed” countries in the world. 20 In 2013, the Human
Development Report ranked the DRC 186 on the Human Development Index,

11

See infra section II.B.
See id.
13
See Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. § 2(3) (2009).
14
David C.W. Wagner, Note, Breaking the Nexus Between Armed Conflict and
Consumer Products: Where’s the App for That?, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 103, 108
(2012); see also S. 891, § 2(3).
15
DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
16
A Short History of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the
Involvement of NGOs in the Peace Process, WORLD MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY,
http://www.wmd.org/resources/whats-being-done/ngo-participation-peace-negotiations/hist
ory-conflict-democratic-republic (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
17
See DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 5, 25 (noting that natural resources constitute
the DRC’s primary exports and include “34 percent of world cobalt reserves; 10 percent of
world copper reserves; 64 percent of world coltan reserves; and significant amounts of
wood, oil, coffee, diamonds, gold, cassiterite, and other minerals” and that “[t]he DRC’s
abundant natural resources are serving as an incentive for conflict between neighboring
countries’ militias and armed domestic factions”).
18
S. 891, § 2(5); see also DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 24–25.
19
See S. 891, § 2.
20
DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.
12

222

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

joining Niger in the lowest possible ranking out of the countries where data is
available. 21
The DRC’s main exports include columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, wolframite,
and gold. 22 These resources are grossly undervalued, and armed groups profit from
these resources by “coercively exercising control over mining sites from where
they are extracted and locations along which they are transported for export.” 23
Armed groups use cheap mining practices to further obtain profit. Mining in the
DRC is largely conducted through “artisanal miners, who use hand-held tools to
extract minerals from underground sources and rivers.” 24 These miners often work
in deplorable conditions; they lack protective clothing and safety equipment, and
they are often “exposed to a range of health risks, such as falling rocks and dust
inhalation.” 25 Additionally, child labor is a common source of mining
production. 26
Sexual violence and rape are common tools used by armed groups to maintain
power over helpless mining communities. In 2010, a study revealed that DRC
women are victimized at a rate of nearly one rape every minute.27 This study also
estimated that around 1.8 million Congolese women have been victims of rape. 28
Widespread government corruption is also contributing to the crisis in the DRC.
The DRC’s “weak and abusive security forces” are unable to eradicate the armed
groups and are “poorly disciplined, ill equipped, and the worst abusers of human
rights in the DRC.” 29
To combat the violence and the destruction, the U.N. has passed numerous
resolutions, 30 and the United States has provided millions of dollars in aid to the

21

U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, THE RISE OF THE
SOUTH: HUMAN PROGRESS IN A DIVERSE WORLD 147 (2013), available at http://hdr.undp.
org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf.
22
DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 5; see also S. 891, § 2(8).
23
S. 891, § 2(8).
24
AMNESTY INT’L, PROFITS AND LOSS: MINING AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN KATANGA,
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 6 (2013), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/AFR62/001/2013/en/7052e03b-89db-43b3-b607-7f0c8e11f18d/afr620012013
en.pdf.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 14 (“The presence of child workers in the mines in Katanga is a serious
problem. Some 40,000 children under the age of 16 years are believed to be working on
mine sites in Kolwezi, Kipushi and Likasi.”).
27
See Amber Peterman et al., Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence Against
Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1060, 1064–65
(2011) (estimating that every five minutes, four women in the DRC are raped).
28
See id. at 1063.
29
DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 19–20 (“[T]he DRC army is responsible for 40
percent of recently reported human rights violations—including rapes, mass killings of
civilians, and summary executions—and DRC police and other security forces have killed
and tortured civilians with total impunity.”).
30
See infra Part II.B.
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DRC to improve security in an effort to curtail the violence. 31 In 2007, the United
States provided $181.5 million to the DRC in the form of humanitarian, economic,
social-development, governance, and security aid. 32 However valiant these efforts,
the crisis in the DRC continues and the U.N. has urged its member states to
“ensure that importers, processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral
products under their jurisdiction exercise due diligence on their suppliers and on
the origin of the minerals they purchase.” 33 The idea behind the U.N. resolutions
was to force user accountability to defund armed groups causing instability in the
region. 34 As I will discuss below, the United States has answered this call by
passing section 1502 of Dodd-Frank, which creates supply chain accountability.
B. Past Legislative Efforts to Combat Violence in the DRC and Dodd-Frank
Section 1502
In 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution that proclaimed its
“grave concern at the repeated human rights violations” throughout the DRC and
called on the “international community to increase, without delay, its support for
humanitarian activities.” 35 In 2010, the U.N. Security Council recommended that
its member states “enhance information sharing [of conflict minerals practices] and
joint action at the regional level to investigate and combat regional criminal
networks and armed groups involved in the illegal exploitation of natural
resources.” 36 Even before this admonition, and many others from the U.N., 37
Congress first attempted to pass the Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008
(CCCA). 38 The CCCA aimed to prohibit importation of products that contained or
were derived from columbite-tantalite or cassiterite mined or extracted from the
DRC. 39 Introduced in 2008, the CCCA never received a floor vote and thus
failed. 40 Congress’s second attempt was the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009
(CCMA). 41 The CCMA resembled section 1502 of Dodd-Frank, and it called on
the SEC to require annual disclosure of activities involving use of “columbitetantalite, cassiterite, and wolframite” from the DRC. 42 However, the CCMA was
31

DRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 12.
Id.
33
S.C. Res. 1857, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1857 (Dec. 22, 2008).
34
See id.
35
S.C. Res. 1376, ¶¶ 5–6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1376 (Nov. 9, 2001).
36
S.C. Res. 1952, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1952 (Nov. 29, 2010).
37
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1857, supra note 33, ¶ 15.
38
Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008, S. 3058, 110th Cong. § 1 (2008).
39
Id. pmbl. (stating the purpose of the bill was to “prohibit the importation of certain
products that contain or are derived from columbite-tantalite or cassiterite mined or
extracted in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and for other purposes”).
40
S. 3058 (110th): Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008, GOVTRACK.US, https:/
/www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s3058 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
41
Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. § 1 (2009).
42
Id. pmbl.
32
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also unsuccessful. 43 The third and successful attempt was the addition of section
1502 to Dodd-Frank.
In passing section 1502, Congress felt that the need for conflict mineral
disclosure was “literally [a] life-and-death issue.” 44 Section 1502 amended the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), adding a new disclosure
requirement under subsection 13(p) that directs the SEC to create a rule to compel
companies using conflict minerals to disclose that information on their websites. 45
Congress summed up its intent in introducing section 1502:
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict
minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping
to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and
gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian
situation therein, warranting the provisions of section 13(p) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (b). 46
Conflict minerals are defined under Dodd-Frank as “columbite-tantalite
(coltan), cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives; or any other minerals or
its derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.” 47 Section 1502 will
require companies using conflict minerals to undertake a diligent effort to
determine whether those minerals originated in the DRC and adjoining countries. 48
If a company concludes after a diligent effort that their minerals are not directly or
indirectly financing or benefiting armed groups in the DRC or adjoining countries,
the company may list their products as “DRC conflict free.” 49 To define and
properly implement this law, Congress required the SEC to create rules that would
fulfill this disclosure mandate no later than 270 days after the passage of DoddFrank. 50
III. THE SEC’S RULE AND SUBSEQUENT LEGAL CHALLENGE
This Part will outline the SEC’s disclosure requirements under section 1502,
the financial-reporting impact on U.S. companies, and the disclosure’s potential
effect on future market behavior. This Part also discusses the first major legal
43

S. 891 (111th): Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s891 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
44
156 CONG. REC. S3817 (May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
45
15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(E) (2012).
46
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
§ 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010).
47
Id. § 1502(e)(4).
48
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A).
49
Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii).
50
Id. § 78m(q)(2)(A).
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challenge to the Conflict Minerals Rule, its failure in the district court, and its
pending appeal.
A. The SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule
Dodd-Frank left many questions unanswered, with the SEC facing an uphill
battle to determine some of the subtleties of the Dodd-Frank language. The
Conflict Minerals Rule encompasses many public companies in the United States
and, as such, has garnered national attention. 51 The rule is far reaching in
determining which minerals qualify as “conflict” and which issuers under the
Exchange Act are required to comply. The minerals the rule encompasses will be
discussed here; the issuer requirements are better understood in the context of the
rule’s application.
The SEC adopted the same definition of a conflict mineral as Dodd-Frank,
including “cassiterite, columbite-tantalite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives, or
any other minerals or their derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be
financing conflict in the Covered Countries.” 52 The following table lists the
common industry uses of conflict minerals. 53

51

See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,278 (Sept. 12, 2012) (discussing
how the SEC received over thirteen thousand comment letters during the rulemaking
process).
52
Id. at 56,283. Many commentators admonished the SEC to define the term
“derivatives” to ensure unambiguous application. Id. at 56,285. The SEC agreed with the
“ambiguity” of the word and adopted the rule that derivatives are limited to the “3Ts”—
tantalum, tin, and tungsten—“unless the Secretary of State determines that additional
derivatives are financing conflict in the Covered Countries, in which case they are also
considered ‘conflict minerals.’” Id.
53
Id. at 56,283–84.
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Conflict Mineral
Cassiterite

Common Use
Tin production which is used in alloys,
tin plating, and solders for joining pipes
and electric circuits

Columbite-tantalite

An ore from which niobium and
tantalum is extracted
Mobile telephones, computers,
videogame consoles, digital cameras,
and used as an alloy for making carbide
tools and jet engine components
Jewelry, electronics communications,
and aerospace equipment
Mineral used to produce tungsten,
which is used for metal wires;
electrodes; and contacts in lighting,
electronics, electrical, heating, and
welding applications

Tantalum

Gold
Wolframite

The SEC noted in its final report that “[b]ased on the many uses of these
minerals, we expect the Conflict Minerals Statutory Provision to apply to many
companies and industries and, thereby, the final rule to apply to many issuers.” 54
The industry has estimated that this rule will affect at least six thousand issuers,
which is about half of all publicly traded companies in the United States. 55 The
rule became effective November 13, 2012, with a compliance date of May 31,
2014. 56
The Conflict Mineral Rule is fairly complex; however, it can be broken down
into three general steps. Step one is a question of threshold, where issuers will have
to examine whether their business practices fall within the purview of the rule.57
Step two asks issuers who do fall within the rule to complete a “reasonable country
of origin inquiry” to determine the source of their supply chain. 58 Step three
requires companies that have found or suspect their materials originate in the DRC
and surrounding countries (hereinafter referred to as “Covered Countries”) to
conduct a chain of custody analysis to determine where in the Covered Countries
the materials originate, whether in warlord-controlled mines or legitimate business
operations. 59
54

Id. at 56,284.
KPMG INT’L, CONFLICT MINERALS PROVISION OF DODD-FRANK: IMMEDIATE
IMPLICATIONS AND LONG-TERM OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMPANIES 2 (2011), available at
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/doddfrank-conflict-minerals.pdf.
56
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,309.
57
Id. at 56,279.
58
Id. at 56,280.
59
Id. at 56,280–91.
55
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1. Issuers Required to Report Under the Conflict Minerals Rule
There are two aspects of applying the first step of the Conflict Minerals Rule.
First, the issuer must determine, based on its reporting status, whether the issuer
categorically falls within the Conflict Mineral Rule. 60 Second, if the issuer falls
categorically within the rule, it must determine whether conflict minerals are
necessary to the functionality or production of its product. 61
The Conflict Mineral Rule categorically applies to any issuer who “files
reports with the Commission under Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Exchange
Act, including domestic companies, foreign private issuers, and smaller reporting
companies.” 62 The SEC determined this to be the appropriate application of section
1502 because the only limiting factor found in the Dodd-Frank issuer language was
that the minerals must be “necessary to the functionality or production of products
manufactured or contracted by the issuer to be manufactured.”63 This definition of
applicability sweeps up over half of the public companies in the United States.64
Additionally, the rule was not confined to direct manufacturers using conflict
minerals. The SEC determined that the congressional intent was to capture all
issuers where “conflict minerals are necessary to the functionality or production”
of their products. 65 Therefore, the rule applies to both directly manufacturing 66
issuers and issuers who contract to manufacture. 67 Issuers who contract to
manufacture are those issuers who have “actual influence over the manufacturing
of their products.” 68 The SEC provided the example of a cell phone service
provider who specifies to the manufacturer that the device must be able to work on

60

Id. at 56,279.
Id.
62
Id. at 56,287.
63
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64
KPMG INT’L, supra note 55, at 2.
65
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,290.
66
Id. at 56,290–91.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 56,291. An issuer should not be viewed as contracting to manufacture a
product if its actions involve no more than
61

(a) Specifying or negotiating contractual terms with a manufacturer that do
not directly relate to the manufacturing of the product . . . unless the issuer
specifies or negotiates taking actions so as to exercise a degree of influence over
the manufacturing of the product that is practically equivalent to contracting on
terms that directly relate to the manufacturing of the product; or
(b) Affixing its brand, marks, logo, or label to a generic product
manufactured by a third party; or
(c) Servicing, maintaining, or repairing a product manufactured by third
party.
Id.
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a certain network. 69 This type of market behavior does “not in-and-of-itself exert
sufficient influence” to be considered “contract to manufacture.” 70
The Conflict Mineral Rule does not apply to “an issuer that mines or contracts
to mine . . . unless the issuer also engages in manufacturing, whether directly or
indirectly through contract . . . .” 71 If the issuer finds that it does not manufacture
or contract to manufacture conflict minerals, the issuer’s next step is to determine
whether the use of conflict minerals are “necessary to the functionality or
production” of their product. 72 If so, Dodd-Frank mandates that issuers disclose
such. 73
Whether a mineral is necessary to the functionality or production of a product
was arguably the most contested portion of the Conflict Minerals Rule. The SEC
chose not to define what is necessary to the production or functionality of a
product, instead opting to provide issuers guidance. To determine what is
necessary to the functionality of a product, the SEC suggested that an issuer should
evaluate
(1) Whether a conflict mineral is intentionally added to the product or
any component of the product and is not a naturally-occurring byproduct; (2) whether a conflict mineral is necessary to the product’s
generally expected function, use, or purpose; or (3) if a conflict mineral
is incorporated for purposes of ornamentation, decoration or
embellishment, whether the primary purpose of the product is
ornamentation or decoration. 74
A similar standard applies to determine what is necessary to produce a
product. 75 Some issuers urged the SEC to adopt a de minimis exception to protect
an issuer’s products that contain “trace, nominal, or insignificant amounts” of the
conflict mineral. 76 The SEC cited the lack of a de minimis exception in the
statutory language of section 1502 and relied heavily on the State Department’s
69

Id. at 56,291.
Id.
71
Id. at 56,292.
72
Id. at 56,285.
73
15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(2)(B) (2012).
74
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,279.
75
Id. To evaluate what is necessary to the production of a product, the SEC suggested
that issuers ask
70

(1) Whether the conflict mineral is intentionally included in the product’s
production process, other than if it is included in a tool, machine, or equipment
used to produce the product (such as computers or power lines); (2) whether the
conflict mineral is included in the product; and (3) whether the conflict mineral
is necessary to produce the product.
Id.
76

See Id. at 56,295.
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finding that many products contain conflict minerals in “very limited quantities”
and, therefore, a de minimis exception “‘could have a significant impact on the
final rule.’” 77 If the issuer determines that conflict minerals are not necessary to the
functionality or production of its products, the issuer’s reporting obligations end.
All other covered issuers will proceed to step two. 78
2. Determining Whether Conflict Minerals Originated in Covered Countries and
the Resulting Disclosure
Step two requires issuers to perform a “reasonable country of origin inquiry”
to determine if their conflict minerals originated in the Covered Countries.79 This
is the most discretionary step, allowing the issuer to determine the appropriate
inquiry into the origination of its conflict minerals.80 The SEC has provided some
guidance, requiring issuers to use due diligence “reasonably designed to determine
whether the issuer’s conflict minerals did originate in the Covered Countries, or
did come from recycled or scrap sources”; additionally, this inquiry must be
completed in “good faith.” 81 This may require issuers to obtain representations
from facilities and immediate suppliers demonstrating that the conflict minerals did
not originate in the Covered Countries. 82
Depending on the results of this inquiry, the issuer may need to proceed to
step three. If the issuer finds that its conflict minerals did not originate in or “has
no reason to believe” that its minerals “may” have originated in the Covered
Countries (including recycled or scrap minerals), the issuer’s disclosure obligations
are minimal. 83 These issuers must disclose the results (e.g., scrap, recycled, or nonCovered Country origin) and the steps taken in the reasonable country of origin
inquiry to the SEC. 84 This disclosure is required on the Form SD or Special
Disclosure that was created by the SEC to accommodate new disclosures under
Dodd-Frank. 85 Additionally, an issuer will have to disclose that its conflict
minerals did not originate in the DRC by posting the Form SD to the issuer’s
website. 86 After these disclosures, the issuer’s reporting obligations end.
77

Id. at 56,298 (citations omitted).
See id. at 56,283.
79
Id. at 56,310.
80
Id. at 56,311–12. The SEC determined that because a reasonable country of origin
inquiry can “differ among issuers based on the issuer’s size, products, relationships with
suppliers, or another factor,” issuers should be free to tailor their reasonable country of
origin inquiry. Id. at 56,311.
81
Id. at 56,312.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 56,313.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 56,280.
86
Fact Sheet: Disclosing the Use of Conflict Minerals, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171562058#.UuKEWmTn-iZ (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
78
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Conversely, if the issuer “knows” or has “reason to believe” that its minerals
originated in the Covered Countries, the issuer must proceed to step three. 87
3. The Conflict Minerals Rule and Supply Chain Due Diligence
Step three of the Conflict Minerals Rule applies to issuers who know or have
reason to know that their conflict minerals originated in the Covered Countries.
These issuers are required to use a “nationally or internationally recognized due
diligence framework,” if available for the specific mineral, to determine the source
and chain of custody of their conflict minerals. 88 For each issuer, depending on the
results of its due diligence and chain of custody analysis, the reporting obligations
under the Conflict Minerals Rule will differ. 89
First, if an issuer finds its minerals are either from scrap or recycled sources
or do not originate in the Covered Countries, the reporting obligations are
minimal. 90 These issuers are only required to file a Form SD disclosing the issuer’s
findings (e.g., scrap, recycled, or non-Covered Countries origin), a description of
the reasonable country of origin inquiry, and the issuer’s due diligence measures
undertaken. 91 The rule also requires the issuer’s determination to be posted on the
issuer’s website and for the issuer to provide a link to this web address on the
Form SD. 92
Second, if the issuer determines that its conflict minerals originate or may
originate in the Covered Countries and are not from recycled or scrap resources,
the issuer is required to complete a Conflict Minerals Report (CMR) in addition to
the Form SD disclosures. 93 The CMR is a reflection of the issuer’s conflict status
(i.e., whether the minerals have or have not been found to be DRC conflict free). 94
For a product to be labeled “DRC conflict free,” an issuer must determine that its
product “do[es] not contain conflict minerals that directly or indirectly finance or
benefit armed groups” in the Covered Countries. 95 Conversely, products that are
not found to be DRC conflict free are products containing minerals that can be
traced directly or indirectly to financing or benefiting armed groups. 96 Every CMR
must include “a description of the measures the issuer has taken to exercise due
87
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diligence on the source and chain of custody of [the issuer’s] conflict minerals,”
along with “a certified independent private sector audit.” 97 The purpose of the
private sector audit is to validate the CMR by ensuring that it conforms to a
nationally recognized due-diligence framework. 98 Additional disclosures may be
required on the CMR depending on the issuer’s conflict status.
Including the general CMR disclosures, issuers who are not DRC conflict free
must also report the following on their CMRs: (1) which products manufactured
are not DRC conflict free; (2) the facilities used in processing the conflict
minerals; (3) the country of origin; and (4) the efforts to determine the location of
the mine with the “greatest possible specificity.” 99 Significantly, the SEC does not
require that issuers label or disclose the conflict mineral status on their products; 100
rather, the CMR must be publically displayed only on the issuer’s website. 101 DRC
conflict free issuers have no further reporting obligations on the CMR. 102
Issuers that are unable to say with certainty where their minerals originated or
whether their trade practices are benefiting or financing armed groups are given a
two-year window in which they can label their products as “DRC conflict
undeterminable.” 103 This allows issuers more time to investigate the chain of
custody of their conflict materials. DRC conflict undeterminable issuers will
include the following on their CMRs: (1) the products manufactured or contracted
to be manufactured that are DRC conflict undeterminable; (2) country of origin, if
known; (3) facilities used to process the conflict minerals; (4) the efforts
undertaken to determine the mine location within the “greatest possible
specificity”; and (5) the steps the issuer has or will take to mitigate the risk that its
minerals will finance or benefit armed groups. 104 No independent audit is required
for this type of CMR. 105
B. National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC 106
In true regulatory fashion, the Conflict Minerals Rule has received backlash
from both the industry and scholars. 107 The rule’s complexity and high cost of
compliance have driven the industry to the courts. In July 2013, the District Court
97
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for the District of Columbia ruled on the first major challenge to the SEC’s
Conflict Minerals Rule. 108 This litigation brought to light many of the industry’s
issues with the SEC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank. The plaintiffs, the National
Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Business
Roundtable, challenged the SEC’s implementation of section 1502 by posing three
major questions to the court: (1) Is the SEC required to consider whether or not its
rule will actually achieve Congress’s humanitarian goals? 109 (2) Was the SEC
required to adopt a de minimis exception, despite the silence on the issue in the
Dodd-Frank language? 110 (3) By requiring disclosure on an issuer’s website, has
the SEC improperly stigmatized speech and thus run afoul of the First
Amendment? 111 Each of these challenges was unsuccessful, and the Conflict
Minerals Rule remains on track for implementation in May of 2014. 112
1. The SEC Was Not Required to Consider if the Conflict Minerals Rule Would in
Fact Achieve Congress’s Goals of Defunding Armed Groups in the DRC
First, the plaintiffs raised several challenges under the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Exchange Act, claiming that the SEC failed to uphold its
statutory duty to interpret Dodd-Frank. 113 The plaintiffs asserted that the SEC
failed to analyze the costs and benefits of the rule “in contravention of its statutory
directives under the Exchange Act.” 114 Specifically, the plaintiffs urged the court
to adopt a standard that would require the SEC to evaluate whether the Conflict
Minerals Rule would achieve the humanitarian goals of section 1502. 115 However,
the court disagreed, finding that the Exchange Act places no such burden on the
SEC. 116 The court cited section 3(f) of the Exchange Act, which only requires the
SEC to “consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” 117 Additionally, in past
precedent, courts have only invalidated an SEC rule where the SEC was
“statutorily required” to evaluate the “economic implications” of implementing a
new rule. 118 Therefore, the SEC “appropriately deferred to Congress’s
determination” and was not required to weigh the effectiveness of the new rule on
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Congress’s humanitarian goals. 119 Moreover, the SEC fulfilled its efficiency,
competition, and capital information mandate by properly considering the impact
and cost of the rule on the industry. 120
2. The SEC Was Well Within Its Discretion in Excluding a De Minimis Exception
from the Final Conflict Minerals Rule
The plaintiffs next challenged the SEC’s determination that Dodd-Frank did
not mandate the adoption of a de minimis threshold exception. 121 The plaintiffs
fervently argued that Dodd-Frank required the SEC to adopt a de minimis
exception that would exclude issuers whose products are made up of less than 1%
of conflict minerals material. 122 The plaintiffs argued that the lack of de minimis
language in section 1502 left the decision to create a de minimis exception to the
SEC and that the nature of the rule demanded that the SEC include a de minimis
exception. 123 The SEC agreed that it had the authority but argued that if the
Conflict Minerals Rule were to include a de minimis exception, the rule would
inevitably be swallowed up. 124 This is because when conflict minerals are used in
products, they are often used in minimal amounts. 125 Therefore, the SEC rejected
the exception in an effort to further Congress’s disclosure goals. The court agreed,
deferring to the SEC. It reasoned that the determination was the “product of
reasoned decision-making,” upholding the rule on this point. 126
3. The SEC Did Not Violate the First Amendment by Requiring Both Regulatory
and Public Disclosures of Conflict Mineral Status
Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that “‘by compelling companies to publicly
state on their own websites . . . that certain of their products are ‘not DRC conflict
free,’” the Conflict Minerals Rule and section 1502 improperly compels
“‘burdensome and stigmatizing speech’ in violation of the First Amendment.” 127
The disclosures at issue are the requirements to report, whether through a Form SD
or a Conflict Mineral’s website, “conflict minerals sourcing practices.” 128 The
court found that based on the commercial nature of the disclosures, it was required
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to apply intermediate scrutiny. 129 The court applied the Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 130 intermediate scrutiny standard,
which requires (1) an important and substantial government interest; (2) the
interest to “directly advance[] the government interest asserted”; and (3) that “the
fit between the ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable.” 131
The plaintiffs did not contest the first element, recognizing that Congress does
have a substantial and important interest in “promoting peace and security in the
DRC.” 132 However, the plaintiffs argued that the disclosure requirements are too
indirect and lack sufficient empirical support to advance the government’s
purported humanitarian and foreign policy interests. 133 The court rejected these
arguments because the Supreme Court has found, in the context of foreign
relations, that Congress need only act with “informed judgment rather than
concrete evidence,” 134 meaning Congress is free to paint with a broader brush in
the arena of foreign relations. 135 The court found that Congress acted within its
“informed judgment” in concluding that in order to combat the problems in the
DRC, the government must shed light on the system that is funding these
operations. 136 The plaintiffs also contended that the third prong of the analysis was
not met. 137
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that by forcing a company to list products
as “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free,’” the SEC imposes effectively a
“scarlet letter” on issuers and there are other less restrictive measures the SEC
could undertake to effectuate its goals. 138 The court rejected this contention on
many grounds. 139 First, issuers under the Conflict Minerals Rule are merely
required to disclose information in a Form SD or CMR. 140 In turn, these reports are
then published on the company’s website. 141 Second, no issuer is required to
physically label products “not DRC conflict free,” and issuers may clarify or add
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additional disclosure if desired. 142 The court found that this was a “reasonable fit”
under the Central Hudson standard. 143
The court’s ruling on the Conflict Minerals Rule was a major victory for
conflict mineral activists. The celebration could be short lived, however. The case
is currently on expedited review to the D.C. Circuit. But whatever the outcome,
Dodd-Frank is still good law. The plaintiffs in this action are only seeking to chip
away at the SEC’s rule. Therefore, even if the D.C. Circuit overturned part of the
rule, it is unlikely that companies will evade conflict mineral disclosure in the
future. The arguments in this case are best described as ways of buying the
industry time to either change the law or delay implementation until the last
possible moment. No matter the outcome of D.C. Circuit case, the normative
arguments made in this Note remain—Congress has the power to promulgate
disclosure requirements on morality issues. And, in many cases, morality is
material. 144
IV. MORALITY IS MATERIAL
So far this Note has provided a look into how Congress is now using the SEC
to implement congressional humanitarian goals in the DRC. Many have argued
that this is an inappropriate use of the SEC’s delegated congressional authority.
Traditionally, the SEC has been the watchdog of financially material information,
or, more simply put, information that will affect an investor’s decision making
when purchasing securities. It is important to note that the question of
“materiality” is moot under the Conflict Minerals Rule because the legislative
mandate requires disclosure regardless of materiality. 145 However, the doctrinal
question remains: Are human rights and other socially responsible goals a job for
the SEC’s disclosure machine? Scholars are concerned that rules like the Conflict
Minerals Rule are not aimed at material considerations but rather “underlying
142
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public policy” goals that are “not necessarily of interest to any investor.” 146 I
disagree with this assessment. The Conflict Minerals Rule may effectuate public
policy goals, but it also provides information that is inherently material to
investors.
To support this proposition, I will first outline, generally, the standard for
materiality under our current securities laws. I will then provide two simple
arguments: not only are human rights disclosures financially material, but so are
the nonfinancial aspects of the Conflict Minerals Rule. While on their face, the
humanitarian goals in the DRC do not seem inherently “financial,” human rights
violations and a company’s involvement can translate into tort liability, insurance
costs, or potential financial penalties related to international labor and
humanitarian law violations. These costs, and the risks associated with them, are
just as material to an investor as the information on a Form 10-K. Second, the rise
of the socially responsible investor has shifted the paradigm away from accounting
and financial information, demanding more transparency on issues of human rights
and social responsibility. Socially responsible investors will accept lower returns
for more humanitarian and socially responsible companies. In other words, a
company’s use of DRC conflict minerals will in fact alter the total mix of
information and influence how investors will make purchasing decisions. This is
the essence of materiality.
A. What is Material?
The Securities Act of 1933 147 and the Exchange Act of 1934 148 are together
the foundation of modern securities regulation. The purpose of these laws is to
protect the investing public when investors participate in the securities markets.
Materiality is at the “core” of any “legal discussion of disclosure.” 149 When a
public company solicits the public for capital, a trade-off occurs. Companies agree
to divulge any and all material information in exchange for access to the public
marketplace. The SEC’s role and mission in this trade-off is to “protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” 150
The SEC has traditionally accomplished this goal by being the conduit in which
146
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the investing public receives financially material information. 151 As distilled by the
Supreme Court, a material fact is a fact where there is a “substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.” 152 Put differently, the material fact would likely influence how an
investor would vote and make investing decisions. Commentators have argued that
section 1502 does not meet this standard because social and humanitarian
responsibility does not bear on the financial condition or economic value of a
company. 153 In this next section, I will argue that these critics think too narrowly
of the concept of materiality and overlook how the Conflict Minerals Rule fits
precisely within the materiality definition.
B. The Conflict Minerals Rule Is Inherently Material
As aforementioned, there are two arguments that the Conflict Minerals Rule
represents inherently material information. First, the Conflict Minerals Rule
represents real financial consequences for companies engaged in illicit trading
practices. Second, socially responsible investing has shifted the traditional
materiality definition into nonfinancial factors such as morality.
1. The Conflict Minerals Rule Provides Investors with Material Information that
Directly Weighs on the Profitability of a Company
The Conflict Minerals Rule is related to the financial and economic stability
of a company. When a company engages in risky trade practices, like the transport
and trade of conflict minerals, the issuer exposes the company purse to tort
liability, insurance costs, and potential penalties for violating international labor
and humanitarian laws. 154 For example, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR)
has successfully sued numerous U.S. companies, in U.S. courts, for human rights
violations around the globe. 155 One example is Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 156 where
CCR reached a settlement with Unocal Corporation for its human rights violations
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in Burma. 157 There, four Burmese citizens sued under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
for human rights violations, assault, forced labor, wrongful death, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and imprisonment because of the company’s
involvement in the Myanmar gas pipeline. 158 The Burmese military surrounding
the pipeline project had committed these crimes against the Burmese citizens. 159
Another potential financial liability a corporation may face is violation of
international pillaging law. 160 Pillaging law prohibits theft such as looting,
spoliation, and plundering during war and other armed conflicts. 161 Some scholars
suggest that the law of pillaging is an avenue to hold corporate actors criminally
liable for taking advantage of unstable situations, like that in the DRC, for the
exploitation of natural resources. 162 As investors learn about these risk factors
associated with human rights violations, including ATS liability and pillaging
laws, investors will recognize that “non-compliance represents a significant and
largely preventable financial risk, and thus alter their investment patterns
accordingly.” 163
The Conflict Minerals Rule can be juxtaposed with disclosure guidance
adopted by the SEC in 2010 that requires companies to disclose how their business
practices affect climate change. 164 The general motivation behind the SEC issuing
disclosure guidance was that investors had the right to know whether issuing firms
faced significant environmental regulation and potential litigation liabilities. 165 In
157
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this instance, the SEC responded to investors who felt that companies were not
providing enough data on the potential risks to their profits and operations from
environmental protection laws. 166 Similarly, one can view the Conflict Minerals
Rule as Congress’s recognition of not only the humanitarian benefits of disclosure,
but also of the benefits that will be realized by investors seeking materially
relevant information. Admittedly, the Dodd-Frank statutory language is divorced
of any language hinting at investor materiality. 167 However, Congress arguably
used the SEC to effectuate this goal because Congress understood that conflict
mineral information would be material to investors and would incite change in
market behavior. The SEC recognized this underlying motivator in the rule release,
finding that the Conflict Minerals Rule will “provide information that is material to
an investor’s understanding of the risks in an issuer’s reputation and supply
chain.” 168 Additionally, one commentator noted that the benefits of the Conflict
Mineral Rule would eliminate
competitive disadvantage to companies already engaged in ensuring their
conflict mineral purchases do not fund conflict in the DRC, providing an
opportunity to improve a company’s existing risk management and
supply chain management, stimulating innovation, supporting
companies’ requests for conflict minerals information from suppliers
through legal mandate, and preparing companies to meet a new
generation of expectations for greater supply chain transparency and
accountability. 169
Therefore, the Conflict Minerals Rule arguably presents investors with financial
information that is just as potent as any other SEC filing.
2. The Nonfinancial Moral Factors of the Conflict Minerals Rule Are Material to
Investors
Aside from being financially relevant, the Conflict Minerals Rule also
implicitly recognizes the undercurrent of important nonfinancial material
information in the marketplace. Socially responsible investing has been on the rise
166
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for years. 170 Investors are increasingly relying on “social, environmental, and
governance” information, or what has been called “SEG” information, to make
investing decisions. 171 Investors are already using SEG information to “decide
proxy votes,” “screen mutual funds,” and make “investment related decisions.” 172
These investors make investment decisions with SEG information that “is clearly
material to them, irrespective of its economic implications.” 173 Professor David
Monsma argues, “In a world where social and environmental risks play a greater
role in investor decisions . . . materiality expands to encompass these risks and
thereby creates a new legal threshold for disclosure.” 174
Arguably, many investors, not just socially responsible investors, will be
hesitant to invest in organizations that are funding rape, murder, and starvation in
the DRC. 175 These motivators are not financial, but moral, and carry with them the
power to profoundly shape how investors make purchasing decisions. However,
scholars caution that it will be difficult going forward to draw a line regarding the
“use of the public disclosure system contemplated by the federal securities laws for
the purposes of addressing social, public policy, and geo-political concerns.” 176 I
believe this concern is misguided. Line drawing will occur naturally in the
marketplace. For example, arguably not every humanitarian or social issue will rise
to the level of materiality. Investors will examine the severity of the crisis and,
most importantly, the strength of the relationship between the humanitarian harm
and the corporate involvement. The stronger this relationship is, the more severe
the harm and the more likely investors will find the information material and
demand company disclosure. In section 1502, Congress has simply codified a
market need that has already been set in motion. Increasingly, issuers have begun
to volunteer SEG information—recognizing that investors want more than
financial information when investing. 177 The threat of investor accountability
created by the Conflict Minerals Rule will change trade practices in the DRC
through investors’ access to new information. Whether or not the change will bring
peace to the Congolese people is the subject for another article. What is relevant is
170
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that this information, while not financial, is material, and I believe we will
continue to see Congress and the SEC demand more socially responsible
disclosures in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
The Conflict Minerals Rule is an appropriate use of the SEC’s disclosure
power. Issues of morality that arise in a humanitarian crisis like that in the DRC
are inherently material. The takeaway from this discussion is that U.S. companies
cannot ignore the paradigm shift that is occurring in securities regulation. Congress
will continue to use the powerful reporting mechanism of the SEC to require
disclosures of nonfinancial material information like the illicit trade in the DRC.
Whether the DRC will reap the benefits of these disclosures remains to be seen.

